Another recent example which is called “Virux” (see PE_VIRUX variants - TrendMicro)
2009-02-19
Are you a Conficker Zombie?
Another recent example which is called “Virux” (see PE_VIRUX variants - TrendMicro)
2009-02-13
Conficker; A Bounty Hunter’s Guide
You know things are serious when Microsoft Corp. ponies up a $250,000 bounty. The software vendor is offering the cash in exchange for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the Conficker worm creator(s).
It's part of an unprecedented and coordinated response with ICANN and security researchers from Afilias, AOL LLC , Arbor Networks Inc. , CNNIC, F-Secure Corp. , Georgia Tech, Global Domains International Inc., Internet Storm Center (ISC) , M1D Global, NeuStar Inc. (NYSE: NSR), Public Internet Registry, Shadowserver Foundation, Support Intelligence, Symantec Corp. (Nasdaq: SYMC), and VeriSign Inc. (Nasdaq: VRSN) to disable the hosting and distribution of the worm.
Obviously no one's out to justify or encourage the "Wild West" ethics where this reward's concerned, and it's not the first time Microsoft has gone this route. In 2005, the vendor offered $250,000 for the identity of the creator of Netsky, a.k.a. the Sasser worm, leading to the unmasking of German student Sven Jaschan. But for the interested, the curious, and the bounty-minded, what follows is a starter guide and roadmap to help this latest industry-wide effort along.
What is Conficker?
First, do not get blindsided by the linguistics, and its plethora of names. Conficker.A is what CA Inc. (Nasdaq: CA) calls it, but it also goes by Conficker.worm (McAfee Inc. (NYSE: MFE)); Downadup (Symantec); and Kido and Net-Worm.win32.kido.bt (Kaspersky Lab ). They are all the same thing. It spreads through the use of network shares and weak passwords. Additionally, it uses Windows AutoRun functionality, wherein autorun.inf files are copied to USB drives and other removable media.
When Conficker takes control of the user’s PC
• Injects its code into the address space of one of the “svchost.exe” system processes.
• Disables system restore
• Blocks any addresses which contain the following strings:
indowsupdate / wilderssecurity / threatexpert / castlecops / Spamhaus / cpsecure / arcabit / emsisoft / sunbelt / securecomputing / rising / prevx / pctools / norman / k7computing / ikarus /hauri / hacksoft / gdata / fortinet / ewido / clamav / comodo / quickheal / avira / avast / esafe / ahnlab / centralcommand / drweb / grisoft / eset nod32 / f-prot / jotti / Kaspersky / f-secure / computerassociates / networkassociates / etrust /panda / Sophos / trendmicro / mcafee / Norton Symantec / Microsoft defender / rootkit / malware / spyware / virus
Each day, the worm generates a fresh list of about 250 random domain names such as abfhhibxci.cn. It then checks those domains for new instructions, verifying their cryptographic signature to ensure that they were created by Conficker's author. It should be stressed that this malware is infecting PCs but has not yet been switched on via command and control functions to act as a botnet.
From whence did Conficker spring?
Where are the major infection centers?
Who created Conficker?
Resolving – trafficconverter2.biz


Happy hunting!
2009-02-11
Cloning Security
Coming to a PC near you very soon is an innovative and possibly deadly combination of well known exploitation techniques, emerging from the dark side of the Internet. What makes this new attack so innovative are the targets: Internet security information and research Web sites. Hackers in the last week have been creating exact clones of Internet security Websites using proxies, DNS (domain name server) spoofing or redirection, and dedicated denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.It should not surprise anyone to realize Internet security research, forums, and information Websites are attacked on a regular or even daily basis. Mostly it is nuisance spam, bogus log-in attempts, or hack attempts to gain entry to the administrator side, and in more intense cases, DDoS.
But this cloning approach emerged from investigation only in the last week. To begin with, there was the discovery purely by accident, of an exact clone of the HostExploit Website. After further investigation, it was discovered this was not an isolated case, with one server hosting clones of security sites like avertlabs.com (McAfee), isc.sans.org, milw0rm.com, nmap.org, packetstormsecurity.org, secunia.com, securiteam.com, securityfocus.com, securityreason.com, thedarkvisitor.com, www-935.ibm.com (IBM), and xforce.iss.net (IBM).
In itself this was a worrying discovery, if simply viewed from content theft, hijacked traffic, click through, SSL forgery, PayPal information, and RSS links etc., of relatively high-traffic security sites. However, in parallel to the emergence of these clones commencing on Friday and over the weekend, several of the real sites listed as clones and a few others -- Metasploit, Zone-H, and Kaspersky -- were under hacker or DDoS attack, and in some cases a mixture of the two. For a while a couple sites were completely unavailable for a day or so, and one or two are still under a continuous DDoS attack.
Working off limited data from server logs and network traffic, at least a couple of the attacks originated from Poland (AS5617 TPNET); Romania (AS 9050 Romtelecom, AS39650 VIANET); Russia (JSC servers funneled via RTcomm, and Rostelecom via AS9002 RETN); and Turkey (AS9121 TTNet, AS8386 KOCNET). Many of these servers appear regularly on lists of the worst European offenders for hosting spam and exploits, according to the German-based anti-spam service UCEprotect.
I must emphasize here that there's no proven link between the appearances of the clones and this weekend's attacks. This could be a simple coincidence, but as Edmund Burke said. "Better be despised for too anxious apprehensions, than ruined by too confident security." It does leave the open question, if by hacking and DDoS, the real security Websites were offline the only source available could be the clones. It is by a simple step to include by DNS redirection, cookie plants, and other exploits, to ensure visitors went to and continued to visit the false, cloned sites.
Consider the mayhem that could be caused by providing bad file downloads and misinformation using these sorts of exploits, botnets, and spam, or even distorting the core news and advisories this sector, its enterprise customers and the press depend upon. Worst of all, even without any changes from the real sites, the data gathered from all those misdirected, security-minded visitors would be hugely valuable.
Obviously the intended outcome of the attacks and the clones is to damage reputations, create distrust, and ultimately make it easier for cyber-criminals to operate. The good news is thanks to swift action, these discovered clones and the hacker site serving them are offline. This is certainly not the last we will see of this approach.
2009-01-28
Cyberwar – The Cyber Iron Curtain: Now Kyrgyzstan – Part 2
The Kyrgyzstan DDoS Attacks of January, 2009: Assessment and Analysis
Note: This post is a joint effort of HostExploit.com, Jeff Carr of IntelFusion and Greg Walton of InforWarMonitor.net. Further analysis may be forthcoming by individual contributors at their respective Web sites.
On January 18, 2009, a large scale DDoS attack began against Kyrgyzstan Internet service providers (ISPs). Key national Web server site Asiainfo.kg and the Kyrgyzstan official domain registration service Domain.kg have only been available intermittently from Jan 18th 09.
Russian-based servers primarily known for cybercrime activity have been identified through IP analysis with the attacks on Kyrgyzstan.
Figure 1 shows the Internet routing during the later stages of the Kyrgyzstan DDoS attacks.
Figure 3 provides a BGP (Border Gate Protocol) Internet traffic routing for the period of the 15thth of January 2009, with primary focus on highlighting the DDoS traffic against AS8511 Asiainfo of Kyrgyzstan.
Timeline of Political Events
January 17: Prominent opposition leader detained in Kyrgyzstan
January 17: Political confrontation intensifies. Opposition activists form new coalition UPM (United People’s Movement)
January 19: Two opposition leaders detained and charged
January 19: Russia presses Kyrgyzstan to close US base
January 20: Kyrgyzstan Opposition denied use of Parliament Press Center
January 21: Kyrgyzstan government targets opposition
January 22: Journalists ordered to file personal information
January 22: Kyrgyz Opposition Party denied registration
Analysis
The Kyrgyz cyber attacks during the week of January 18th fall right in line with an escalating series of repressive political actions by the Bakiev government against this latest attempt to form an opposition political party – the United Peoples Movement (UPM). Bakiev should know, since it was the Tulip Revolution in 2005 (and the last time that DDoS attacks were utilized in Kyrgyzstan) which brought him to power.
Opposition leader Omurbek Tekebaev has pointed out the similarities between 2005 and 2009: “Both then and now, you could see people mistrusted those in power, who lacked moral authority. Both then and now, public opinion was completely controlled by the authorities, and there was persecution of journalists and dissidents, criminal persecution of political opponents,” he said.(IWPR article)
This appears to be a cyber operation for hire by the Bakiev government to control information access against its political opposition. The likely culprits are Russian hackers with moderate skill levels who regularly engage in cyber crime.
There is no evidence that the Russian government is directly involved, however Moscow has complete control over the servers owned by JSC and Golden Telecom. To date, no action has been taken by the RF to deny access to these servers by Russian hackers.
Related Links:
Cyberwar – The Cyber Iron Curtain: Now Kyrgyzstan – Part 1Kyrgyz Websites subject to unexplained failure and hacking during the Parliamentary Elections (2005)
The Kyrgyzstan Cyber Attack That No One Is Talking About
2009-01-26
Cyberwar – The Cyber Iron Curtain: Now Kyrgyzstan – Part 1
The reasons for the cyber attacks are sketchy, as the Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev is seen as pro Kremlin. However, as a coincidence which is similar to DDos of Lithuanian web sites last year, when the Lithuanian Prime Minister visited the US. President Bakiyev is to visit Moscow on February 3, to discuss the extension of Russian investment in the Kyrgyz energy sector and Russia are pressurizing Kyrgyzstan to close the US military air base used to support operations in Afghanistan. (Sydney Morning Herald - news link)
Another view is to effectively neutralize the recently unified opposition United People’s Movement (UPM). In its founding charter, the coalition seeks a new political system for Kyrgyz and the removal of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev from office. Complaining of widespread corruption, increasing human rights abuse, and the deterioration of living standards, the UPM is planning a series of protests for February and March.
The Kyrgyz state general prosecutor has launched criminal investigations involving at least four opposition leaders in recent weeks. This past weekend, opposition leader Omurbek Tekebayev, chairperson of the Ata Meken Party, was arrested on vague weapons charges as he headed for a meeting in the northwestern Talas region of Kyrgyz. He has since been released.
The cyberwar attacks on Kyrgyzstan have also by confirmed on IntelFusion and Information Warfare Monitor describing three out of the four Kyrgyz ISPs having been taken down, e.g. AS8511 ASIAINFO Autonomous System Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and the Kyrgyzstan official domain registration service AS8511 ASIAINFO Autonomous System Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Hence from a ‘Cyber Iron-Curtain’ perspective there is now provided a ‘control at will’ by Russia of communication and increasing cyber influence over its former Soviet satellites, a modern parallel to Winston Churchill’s post second world war description of the Soviet sphere of influence. Separately, the blocking of these major websites in Kyrgyzstan suggests that we should probably move this country up the relative scale of importance for the monitoring cyberwar around the world.
Click here for the RSS feed for Part 2 and further reports.
2009-01-23
Majority of Top 100 Websites Host Malicious Content
A majority of the top 100 websites hosted either malicious content or masked redirects according to a Websense report.
Summarizing its significant findings during the six-month period ending in December 2008.
The highlights are:
Web Security
- 77 percent of Web sites with malicious code are legitimate sites that have been compromised.The number of malicious Web sites identified by Websense Security Labs from January first, 2008 through January first, 2009 has increased by 46 percent.
- 70 percent of the top 100 sites either hosted malicious content or contained a masked redirect to lure unsuspecting victims from legitimate sites to malicious sites.
- This represents a 16 percent increase over the last six-month period.
Messaging Security
- 84.5 percent of email messages were spam. This represents a 3 percent decrease over the last six months.
- 90.4 percent of all unwanted emails in circulation during this period contained links to spam sites or malicious Web sites. This represents almost a 6 percent increase in emails containing malicious links to compromised sites.
- Shopping remained the leading topic of spam (22 percent), followed closely by cosmetics (15 percent) and medical (14.5 percent). This remained consistent over the last six months.
- Pornography-related spam increased sharply by 94 percent, but still only represented 9 percent of all email spam. 6 percent of spam messages were phishing attacks, representing a 33 percent decrease over the last six months.
- This represents a change in tactics as spammers concentrated on data-stealing Trojan horses and DNS poisoning tactics to lure victims to malicious sites.
Data Security
- 39 percent of malicious Web attacks included data-stealing code.
- 57 percent of data-stealing attacks are conducted over the Web.
- This represents a 24 percent increase over the six-month period.
The full report is here (PDF)
2009-01-16
Cyberwar - The Battle for Gaza (part 2)
Cyberwar as a word or term, does appear to be inflammatory for many and a cause of considerable debate. Quite simply it is reasonably defined as asynchronous warfare via the web, i.e. the occurrence of two or more processes at different times, and war in its self does not need to have governments fighting each other. As examples, most would agree The American War of Independence was a war, but fought by a section of the populace against a government, or ruling entity.In the follow up to the earlier blog article, here we can initially consider the battle within the social networks. Within Facebook there has been considerable activity, The Jewish Internet Defense Force, a group that claims to have 5,000 members worldwide are reported to regularly attack the Facebook wall of the group “Support the Fight Against Cancer with Just a Click!”, which currently has 1,350,137 members and describes itself as a “cancer truth group” that appears to blame the “Zionist Jewish Mafia” for the disease. While on Facebook we also see as examples; “Israel is not a country!” with 8,878 members, in counterbalance we have "Palestine is not a country Delist it from Facebook as one!" with 3,649 members, and “End the siege on Gaza now….” with 45,806 members.
Within Wikipedia there are similar battles with TheJDIF’s own article being regularly defaced with swastikas or jihadist slogans. However at the same time they have produced a well researched blacklist of what they consider as “Heavily Biased Anti-Israel Wikipedia Editors”. The Wikipedia article on Hamas is being revised by one side of the argument or the other hourly, if we look at the article’s revision history.The more conventional web site hacking reported earlier has shown a marked increase in activity not only against Israeli websites but to wider international targets. Notable targets from the many of the pro-Palestinian effort, have been; the United States Army's Military District of Washington website, NATO Parliamentary Assembly website in Brussels, the UNICEF website in Italy, Government websites in Colombia, and many international academic websites, for example University of Applied Sciences in Switzerland. Commercial websites continue to be targeted increasingly in USA, UK, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Australia, and a notable example of Google’s web site in Egypt.
The most reported hacker recently in this conflict recently is “Agd_Scorp / Peace Crew”, actually these are better known in hackers’ circles as the Turkish group “1923turk”of which 6,319 hacks and defacements can be attributed to over the last week. Other hacker groups of note in quantitative terms over the last week are “Cold z3ro”, “DNS Team”, and “FesH4ck3rs Team”. To complete this small effort on quantification, for webmasters it may be interesting that according to Zone-H.org an organization that has tracked hackers and hacking for many years, 70% of the attacks have been against web sites using Linux based servers. However this may more reflect the larger use of Linux over MS Windows for web serving operating systems.
For one final word of warning, from the world of the cyber criminals who take advantage of this and similar situation and has nothing to do with Gaza protests, thanks to Gary Warner of University of Alabama . Be cautious about fake CNN, other news reports, and UNICEF appeals relating to the Gaza conflict, appearing in your email box. These are actually virus laden that lead to the download of malware. From further analysis the hosting of which is by AS46475
Limestone Networks, Inc., Dallas Texas. This is the same IP hosting as Classmates.com recent malware and blacklisted by Spamhaus SBL71257





